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TIPPING THE SCALES: BALANCING THE WEIGHT 
OF EQUITY WITH LOAN RESCISSIONS IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
Corey Scott Hadley* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the passage of the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) in 1968,1 consumers 
were vulnerable to many deceptive practices employed by creditors when 
participating in loan transactions.  Following the passage of TILA, it was the hope 
of Congress that consumers would now have the tools necessary to fend off 
predatory or deceptive credit terms buried within the fine print of a loan 
agreement.2  Justice Burger described this shift in policy as a “transition in 
congressional policy from a philosophy of ‘Let the buyer beware’ to one of ‘Let the 
seller disclose.’  By erecting a barrier between the seller and the prospective 
purchaser in the form of hard facts, Congress expressly sought ‘to . . . avoid the 
uninformed use of credit.’”3  Unfortunately, Congress could not have foreseen the 
explosion in litigation and the multiple judicial interpretations that ensued in future 
decades.4  Consequently, a series of legislative enactments over the last forty years 
have sought to simplify and clarify disclosure rules for both the consumer and the 
creditor.5  
One of the options afforded to consumers facing a suspect loan agreement is 
the right to rescission.6  When lenders, creditors, and other parties in the credit 
transaction “fail to provide the consumer with proper disclosures about the loan or 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank 
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 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1968). 
 2. Elwin Griffith, Truth In Lending—The Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, 
and Itemization of the Amount Financed in Closed-End Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 191 
(1998) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90-140, at 9 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965).  Griffith 
noted:  
In many instances today, consumers do not know the costs of credit. Charges are often 
stated in confusing or misleading terms. They are complicated by ‘add-ons’ and discounts 
and unfamiliar gimmicks. The consumer should not have to be an actuary or a 
mathematician to understand the rate of interest that is being charged. 
Id. 
 3. Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973). 
 4. See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 14 (Robert A. Cook, Alvin C. 
Harrell & Elizabeth Huber eds., 2000) (discussing “[t]he resulting flood of litigation produced an 
apparently unending, and inconsistent, stream of judicial interpretations and reinterpretations of [Truth 
in Lending] requirements”).  
 5. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221 94 Stat. 
168 (1980), and Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1538 (1982) 
(current versions codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1608 (2009)). 
 6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines “rescission” as “the unilateral unmaking of a contract for a 
legally sufficient reason, such as the other party’s material breach . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1420-21 (9th ed. 2009). 
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their rights,”7 consumers may seek rescission as a possible remedy under TILA.8  
Often, a consumer attempts to exercise their rescission rights in the face of an 
impending foreclosure due to a default on their loan.  Moreover, a natural 
consequence of the impending foreclosure will often be the filing of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy by the consumer.  It is in the Chapter 13 setting that loan rescission 
produces diverging views among the various courts.  
Once a debtor has exercised his or her right to rescission, TILA outlines a 
specific “sequence of procedures to be followed.”9  The sequence of these 
procedures10 becomes disrupted in the Chapter 13 setting and has elicited varied 
analyses among the courts.  Under TILA, the “security interest arising from the 
transaction becomes void and the consumer is no longer liable for any amount 
owed” following the exercise of rescission.11  Next, the creditor is to return any 
money or property in connection with the credit transaction within twenty days and 
must take the necessary measures “to reflect the termination of the security 
agreement.”12  Finally, after the creditor has fulfilled these obligations, the 
consumer must tender back the amount they borrowed.13  The final phase of the 
statute states: “The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except 
when otherwise ordered by a court.”14  This phrase, added by the Truth in Lending 
                                                                                                     
 7. Robert R. Murken, Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home Equity 
Loans Under the Truth In Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 457, 457 (2004). 
 8. It is important to note that the right of rescission does not protect all consumer credit 
transactions.  See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2009) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he regulation 
prohibits certain acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a consumer’s principal 
dwelling”).  Therefore, in order to exercise the right of rescission, a couple of elements must be fulfilled.  
First, there must be a credit transaction involving a consumer.  Second, there must be a security interest 
in the consumer’s principal dwelling. 
 9. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jaaskelainen (Wells Fargo), 407 B.R. 449, 459 (D. Mass. 2009).  
 10. TILA requires:  
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is 
not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, 
including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a 
rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return 
to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or 
otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of 
any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any 
property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of 
the creditor’s obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the 
creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or 
inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the 
location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If 
the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the 
obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to 
pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when 
otherwise ordered by a court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
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Simplification and Reform Act,15 has allowed a majority of courts to reorganize the 
sequence of procedures to be applied when conditioning rescission to consumers in 
a Chapter 13 setting.  
To understand the effects of bankruptcy, it is useful to compare similar actions 
in a non-bankruptcy context.  “In a non-bankruptcy setting, the rights and duties of 
the parties upon TIL[A] rescission are clear and absolute.  Each party must make 
the other as whole as he would have been had the contract never been entered 
into.”16  The problem that arises in the bankruptcy setting is that the debtor has 
arguably been relieved of his “obligation to pay the creditor upon rescission.”17  
The minority of circuit courts reason that once a consumer has rescinded a 
transaction in the bankruptcy context the “creditor is left with an unsecured debt . . 
. [which] may be discharged . . . and to require a chapter 13 Debtor to tender the 
full amount of the loan on a creditor’s now unsecured claim would unfairly 
discriminate among unsecured claims . . . .”18  The majority of courts, however, 
rely on the statutory language of TILA, which provides “that the procedures . . . 
shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.”19  The majority view relies 
on this language as a justification for “hav[ing] the equitable power to condition 
rescission on tender by the borrower.”20  The equitable power to condition 
rescission on tender by the borrower allows the courts to stave off rescission until 
the consumer has paid back the creditor the amount they had borrowed.  
Surprisingly, the “First Circuit has not spoken”21 as to whether courts have the 
equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower.  This Comment 
will first focus briefly on the historical framework of rescission and how rescission 
under TILA is markedly different from common law rescission.  Next, this 
Comment will examine the splits among the circuits and explore the competing 
rationales to determine which circuits may serve as guideposts for the First Circuit.  
This Comment will then focus on the potential approaches to rescission in the 
bankruptcy setting.  Finally, this Comment will consider several recent cases that 
may be illustrative of the direction in which the First Circuit is heading.  In re 
Jaaskelainen,22 a case argued in the Eastern Division of Massachusetts, is 
particularly indicative of the trend that the First Circuit might be following and 
illustrates the divergent judicial interpretations throughout the circuits. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF RESCISSION: TILA STANDARDS VS.  
COMMON LAW 
One of the most influential changes that has stemmed from TILA is the 
                                                                                                     
 15. Pub.L. No. 96-221, § 612(a)(4), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1635(b) (2009)). 
 16. Jaaskelainen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Jaaskelainen), 391 B.R. 627, 645 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2008), vacated in part by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jaaskelainen (Wells Fargo), 407 B.R. 449 
(D. Mass. 2009). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 646. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009).  
 20. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 460. 
 21. Id.  
 22. 391 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). 
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rearranging of the sequence of rescission and tender that had existed under 
common law rescission.  At common law, “the [consumer] must first tender the 
property that he has received under the agreement before the contract may be 
considered void.”23  After the consumer had met his obligations, “the contract 
becomes void and the [consumer] may then bring an action in replevin24 or 
assumpsit25 to insure that the [creditor] will restore him to the position that he was 
in prior to entering into the agreement, i.e., return earnest money or monthly 
payments and void all security interests.”26  The sequence of events under section 
1635(b) of TILA was a pro-consumer departure from the common law standard.  
Section 1635(b) requires that the creditor first void all security interests related to 
the transaction and then return all money and property also associated with that 
transaction.27  Once the creditor has performed his obligations, the consumer must 
then tender back the amount they had borrowed.28  In essence, the TILA standard 
has rearranged the roles of the principal players.  
Section 1635(b) contains language that has produced varied judicial 
interpretations beyond the reordering of the rescission process.  The pertinent 
section states: “If the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 
days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor 
without obligation on his part to pay for it.”29  This provision, which has the 
potential to produce a “debtor windfall”30 in the event of creditor nonperformance, 
has met with considerable resistance from the courts.  Much of this resistance 
garnered its reasoning from principles of equity rather than statutory authorization.  
The final sentence of section 1635(b), which states, “[t]he procedures prescribed by 
this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court,”31 has 
arguably codified the justification for the court’s prior reliance upon notions of 
equitable power.  Consequently, many courts have struggled with the application of 
this phrase, rather than whether it grants a court powers beyond that intended by 
Congress.  Although the justification for modifying the TILA rescission framework 
may now exist in the majority of circuits, the manner in which the modifications 
are exacted is anything but uniform.  Ironically, many courts have come almost 
full-circle back to the common law rescission scheme and now “require the 
consumer to tender loan proceeds up front as a prerequisite to obtaining rescission 
under TILA.”32  Some courts have “rescission conditioned on repayment [by the 
consumer] in installments, and [some] refus[e] to condition rescission on 
                                                                                                     
 23. Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing 17A AM. JUR. 
2D Contracts § 590, at 600-01 (1991)). 
 24. Replevin is an “action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully taken or detained by 
the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds the property until the court decides who 
owns it.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (9th ed. 2009). 
 25. Generally, assumpsit is an “action based on the defendant’s breach of an implied promise to pay 
a debt to the plaintiff.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 142 (9th ed. 2009). 
 26. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140.  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009). 
 32. Murken, supra note 7, at 468. 
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repayment.”33  As a result of these varied approaches throughout the circuits, the 
outcomes are often disjointed and incongruous from one circuit to another.  
This Comment will focus on circuit court splits between those courts that 
require tender by the consumer prior to rescission and those that do not condition 
rescission on tender by the consumer.  Although the language of section 1635(b) of 
TILA is clear and unambiguous, the manner in which it is applied would lead one 
to believe otherwise.  The majority of courts have relied upon traditional notions of 
equity to depart from what appears to be the plain language of the statute in order 
to avoid unduly harsh and inequitable results to creditors.  How various courts 
interpret the sequence of rescission and the ensuing effect on the security interest is 
crucial to that security interest’s treatment in the bankruptcy process. 
III.  COMPETING RATIONALES AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS  
A.  The Majority View: Conditioning Rescission on Tender by the Borrower 
Currently, “the majority of circuits to consider the issue agree that courts have 
the equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower.”34  The 
common thread that runs through these decisions is the ability of the courts to 
freely exercise their powers of equitable discretion.  Moreover, these courts extract 
this notion of equitable discretion not only from the language of TILA, but also 
from “congressional intent.”35  Ironically, the same statute that was created to better 
inform consumers of their credit rights through disclosure has often shielded 
creditors from inequitable results that may ensue from a literal reading of the 
statute.36  Although a comprehensive comparative analysis of the various 
approaches of all the circuit courts is outside the scope of this Comment, a 
sampling of the most frequently cited cases in this field will paint a sufficient 
portrait of the current legal landscape. 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 467. 
 34. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 460.  
 35. Id.; see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264-65, 
which states: 
Upon application by the consumer or the creditor, a court is authorized to modify this 
section’s procedures where appropriate. For example, a court might use this discretion in 
a situation where a consumer in bankruptcy or wage earner proceedings is prohibited 
from returning the property. The committee expects that the courts, at any time during the 
rescission process, may impose equitable conditions to insure that the consumer meets 
his obligations after the creditor has performed his obligations as required under the Act. 
Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Household Fin. Corp (In re Ramirez), 329 B.R. 727, 740 (D. Kan. 2005) 
(noting that “in the context of bankruptcy, where the borrower seeks to compromise or discharge the 
debt on the rescinded loan, judicial modification of the rescission process is well justified”).   The court 
went on to state that: 
Had Congress intended otherwise, there would be no reason to mention bankruptcy, as a 
creditor’s secured interest in a debtor’s homestead would be void upon rescission, 
relegating the debtor’s remaining obligations to an unsecured, often dischargeable status.  
The net effect, then, would be that a debtor receives the entire benefit of the credit 
transaction, often substantial sums of money or what amounts to a free house, while the 
creditor receives nothing, which would be contrary to the purpose of rescission.  
Id. at 742. 
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Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank,37 a frequently cited Sixth Circuit case, presented a 
classic scenario for the proposition that courts must have the equitable power to 
condition rescission upon tender by the borrower.  In Rudisell, the debtors engaged 
in a credit transaction with Fifth Third Bank in order to finance the installation of 
aluminum siding on their home.38  Upon the discovery of disclosure violations 
found within the contract, the debtors rescinded the loan and “argue[d] that they 
should be allowed to rescind, receive back all monies paid to [the creditor], and 
keep the aluminum siding without paying for it.”39  Succinct in its brevity, the court 
simply held that “[s]ince rescission is an equitable remedy, the court may condition 
the return of monies to the debtor upon the return of the property to the creditor.”40 
Because the loan had been consumed by the installation of the aluminum siding, 
the debtors were ordered to “tender the reasonable value of the property they 
received since they cannot give back what they actually received . . . .”41  
The factual scenario in Rudisell is a classic example of a situation that often 
leads the debtor to consider filing for bankruptcy.  When a homeowner has 
financed a large sum of money for home improvements, with their home as the 
security interest, and they later find a disclosure violation in their loan agreement, 
what are their options in jurisdictions that condition the rescission of the loan on 
their ability to give back that which they have already consumed?  For many 
debtors, they seek refuge in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy setting.  Unfortunately for the 
debtors, the bankruptcy setting is not a clear path to debt relief in this situation.  As 
discussed below, the majority of courts are resistant to relegating this form of debt 
to unsecured status, dischargeable in the bankruptcy setting. 
For example, in Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,42 the Ninth Circuit held that 
“a court may impose conditions on rescission that assure that the borrower meets 
her obligations once the creditor has performed its obligations.”43  In Yamamoto, 
the debtors were refinancing an existing mortgage when they defaulted on the loan 
and subsequently alleged disclosure violations in the loan agreement.  The 
Yamamoto court focused not only on whether they had the equitable power to 
modify the sequence of rescission under TILA, but also on whether rescission is 
automatic upon a debtor’s notice.  The court held “[n]either the statute nor the 
regulation establishes that a borrower’s mere assertion of the right of rescission has 
the automatic effect of voiding the contract.”44  In essence, the court has the 
equitable power to determine whether rescission has occurred in addition to 
altering the sequence of rescission events.  The Yamamoto court pointed out that 
although courts do not have the discretion to alter “substantive provisions,”45 they 
do have the discretion to alter “procedural provisions.”46 
                                                                                                     
 37. 622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 38. Id. at 245. 
 39. Id. at 254. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 43. Id. at 1173. 
 44. Id. at 1172 (quoting Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2002)).  
 45. Id. at 1171. 
 46. Id.  
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Consequently, in American Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton,47 the Fourth 
Circuit addressed the procedural requirements associated with the right of 
rescission under section 1635(b).  The debtors refinanced an existing mortgage on 
their primary residence in order to purchase an additional home, but because of 
some discrepancies within the loan documents, they decided to cancel the 
transaction within the proper timeframe as allowed by TILA.48  Upon advice from 
counsel, the debtors offered to sell their new home to the creditor in lieu of a cash 
payment in order to tender back the principal amount of their loan.49  The creditor 
declined this offer and “refused to release its security interest without any provision 
for repayment of the loan proceeds.”50  The debtors countered that the creditor’s 
failure to release its security interest within the twenty days as required by TILA 
resulted in the “forfeit[ure] [of] the loan proceeds.”51  The court held that the 
debtors had “misconstrued the procedural mechanics of § 1635(b) . . . [because] it 
was not the intent of Congress to reduce the mortgage company to an unsecured 
creditor . . . .”52  Relying on traditional notions of equity and earlier decisions,53 the 
court “adopt[ed] the majority view of reviewing courts that unilateral notification 
of cancellation does not automatically void the loan contract.”54  
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of equitable conditioning in Williams 
v. Homestake Mortgage Co.,55 and held that “a court may impose conditions that 
run with the voiding of a creditor’s security interest upon terms that would be 
equitable and just to the parties in view of all the surrounding circumstances.”56   In 
Williams, the borrowers entered into a loan transaction primarily to consolidate 
existing mortgages and to finance the remodeling of a bathroom.57   Upon later 
inspection of the loan documents, the borrowers discovered several TILA 
disclosure violations and sought rescission of the transaction.58  The creditor 
“conceded that rescission was an appropriate remedy [but] . . . sought modification 
of the normal statutory rescission provisions, arguing that . . . the voiding of its 
security interest in Williams’ home should be conditioned upon the return of [the 
money] that Williams owe[d] in unpaid principal.”59  In Williams, the court echoed 
the reasoning of the majority view by maintaining that the “addition of the last 
sentence of 1635(b)60. . . was a reflection of an equitable goal.”61  The reasoning 
                                                                                                     
 47. 486 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 48. Id. at 817-18. 
 49. Id. at 818. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 820-21. 
 53. See, e.g., Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976) (explaining that “when 
rescission is attempted under circumstances which would deprive the lender of its legal due, the 
attempted rescission will not be judicially enforced unless it is so conditioned that the lender will be 
assured of receiving its legal due”).  
 54. Shelton, 486 F.3d at 821. 
 55. 968 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 56. Id. at 1142. 
 57. Id. at 1138. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he procedures prescribed by this 
subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court”). 
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that had existed throughout the majority of circuits prior to the enactment of the 
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act62 was simply codified via the 
additional language in section 1635(b).  The court held that judicial modification of 
the rescission procedures was appropriate and consistent with Congressional intent. 
The Rudisell, Yamamoto, Shelton, and Williams decisions are just a sampling 
of the pervasive view surrounding rescission procedures in the various circuits.   
Principles of equity, limited to the procedural reshuffling of rescission sequencing, 
are the common threads that run through these holdings.  Where statutory authority 
is silent, bankruptcy courts rely on their equitable powers to apply the law.  Where 
equity is implied from the language of a statute, the courts may yield a double-
edged sword: one edge from Congress’s express authority, and the other from the 
court’s ability to equitably interpret the statute.   Although express congressional 
authority and case law justify the majority approach, this Comment will highlight 
the possible inequities that arise within this equitable framework. 
B.  The Minority View: Tender Should Not be Required as a Condition for 
Rescission 
In Sosa v. Fite,63 the Fifth Circuit held that following rescission, a creditor who 
failed to complete their obligations, as outlined in TILA, could forfeit their right to 
the debtor’s tender of the principal amount of the loan.64  The circumstances in 
Sosa presented several scenarios that are not typical of most rescission actions.  
The borrower entered into a loan transaction with a creditor and a contractor that 
secured her home in return for financing for aluminum siding for that home.65  The 
borrower consistently made payments on the loan until the poor work of the 
contractor led her to make no further payments on the loan.66  Shortly thereafter, 
the creditor foreclosed on the home and the borrower rescinded the loan based on 
several serious disclosure violations within the loan documents.67  Included within 
her notice of rescission, the borrower made an “express offer to return the 
aluminum siding, an overture which elicited no response whatsoever from the 
creditors.”68  Following the offer to tender back the aluminum siding, the creditors 
made no effort to terminate the security interest in the borrower’s home.69  The 
creditor’s failure to abide by the statutory scheme as dictated by section 1635(b) 
was, in the eyes of the court, fatal to the creditor’s ability to obtain conditional 
rescission.70 
                                                                                                     
 61. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140. 
 62. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 96-221, § 612(a)(4), 94 Stat. 168, 
175 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988)). 
 63. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 64. Id. at 120.  
 65. Id. at 116. 
 66. Id. as 116-17. 
 67. Id. at 117. 
 68. Id. at 118. 
 69. Sosa, 498 F.2d at 118.  
 70. Id. at 118-19.  The court noted:  
The significance of Sosa’s proffered return and the creditors’ failure to comply with clear 
statutory directives is that Sosa did in fact attempt to make a tender, even though under a 
literal reading of the statute the creditors were unentitled to any tender at all by virtue of 
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Sosa is distinct from most rescission transactions for several key reasons.  
First, upon rescission, the borrower made an attempt to tender back the property 
purchased by the loan.  Second, the creditors made no attempt to release the 
security interest in the debtor’s home as mandated by section 1635(b).  Finally, the 
reasoning employed by the court was prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending 
Simplification and Reform Act.  Although the court did not have the modern 
codified language of section 1635(b) to rely upon in relation to conditional 
rescission, it could easily have employed the long-standing notion of equity upon 
which the majority of courts have relied.  The minority view has the potential to 
create a debtor windfall in circumstances where the creditor has failed to properly 
disclose the terms of the loan agreement.  Contract law attempts to deter debtor 
windfalls and prefers to return parties to their positions prior to entering the 
contract.  The Sosa court argued that the facts presented were precisely one of the 
situations in which a debtor windfall would be justifiable.71 
The Fifth Circuit again addressed the issue of conditional rescission in Gerasta 
v. Hibernia National Bank,72 and shortly thereafter in Harris v. Tower Loan of 
Mississippi, Inc.73  In both cases, the court “refused to permit judicial modification 
where Congress had provided for none.”74  In Gerasta, the court stressed that “the 
[creditor’s] duties are in no way conditional upon the [consumer’s] tender of the 
loan proceeds.”75  In Harris, the court echoed the reasoning in Gerasta when it 
stated “we do not permit a creditor to refuse to perform unless or until the obligor 
tenders payment.”76   
Although the minority approach relies upon a strict adherence to the statutory 
language and sequencing of TILA, it may be viewed as doing so at the expense of 
fairness and equity.  In order for rescission to exist as an effective remedy for the 
misinformed borrower, the exercise of rescission occasionally places harsh 
penalties at the feet of creditors.  “While the goal should always be to ‘restor[e] the 
parties to the status quo ante,’ rescission must also maintain its vitality as an 
enforcement tool.”77  Section 1635(b) provides that a creditor may be subject to 
                                                                                                     
their failure to perform their express obligation of expurgating records of references to 
the invalidated security interest. 
Id. 
 71. Id. at 119.  The court explained that: 
Congress’ intended operation of the statute, as evidenced by the 1635(b) creditor-
forfeiture provision, therefore clearly calls for a debtor windfall if the creditor does not 
set about to rectify his earlier nondisclosures in the manner envisaged by the statute.  In 
fact, the Act flatly provides that if his creditor continues in his untoward ways, the debtor 
incurs no obligation to pay for property which he is at the same time entitled to keep.  
That this result was intended is clear beyond peradventure, for one of the measure’s 
principal sponsors in the House stated: ‘[I]f the seller does not come back to pick up [his 
property] after a 10-day period [following the notice of rescission], the buyer can keep 
this item and he does not even have to pay for it . . . .   
Id. (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14398 (1968) (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan)).  
 72. 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 73. 609 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 74. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140. 
 75. Gerasta, 575 F.2d at 585. 
 76. Harris, 609 F.2d at 123. 
 77. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1142 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harris, 609 F.2d at 123). 
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harsh penalties for non-compliance, but these penalties are rarely exercised because 
of the potential for drastic consequences to creditors for minor errors or omissions.  
This Comment puts forth the proposition that, in some instances, harsh penalties 
are warranted because of the nature of the violations and the conduct of the 
creditor.  In order for TILA to promote unfettered disclosure between debtors and 
creditors, these harsh penalties must occasionally be available to consumers. 
IV.  APPROACHES TO RESCISSION IN THE CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY SETTING 
A.  An Exercise in Equity 
The underlying reasons for a Chapter 13 filing are numerous—ranging from 
drastic changes in the debtors’ economic condition to litigation strategies in order 
to automatically stay78 an impending foreclosure.  Because foreclosure may be a 
bankruptcy-inducing event, debtors must be aware of the differing approaches that 
exist within the courts because these procedures dictate the treatment of their 
estate.  Because of the nuances and complexities that arise between various 
bankruptcy chapters, this Section will focus primarily on the various approaches to 
rescission in the Chapter 13 setting.  However, the overarching analysis is 
applicable within the different bankruptcy chapters.  
The procedural complexities and sequence of events that dictate the path of a 
transaction that is attempting to be rescinded are not clear-cut.  To illustrate, 
assume that a creditor holds a $100,000 refinancing loan secured by an interest in 
the principal residence of Jane.  Because of material disclosures found within the 
refinancing contract, Jane exercises her right to rescission within the applicable 
time frame.  Under section 1635(b) of TILA, the following sequence of events 
occurs: the creditor voids the security interest in the home; the creditor must then 
return any finance charges, payments, or down payments made by Jane within 
twenty days of the rescission notice; and finally, once the creditor has performed 
his obligations, Jane must tender back the principal of the loan.  If Jane files for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy at some point during this process, several complexities may 
arise: What is the nature of the security interest in her home in the bankruptcy 
setting?  Is the previously secured interest now relegated to an unsecured status, 
dischargeable in the bankruptcy setting?  Is the rescission automatic or conditional?  
The answers to these questions vary depending on the court.  
B.  Rescission: Automatic or Conditional? 
The majority views of bankruptcy courts mirror the majority views of non-
bankruptcy courts in the exercise of conditional rescission.79  The equitable nature 
of rescission has been at the heart of the majority reasoning in the bankruptcy 
arena.80  One of the primary concerns in the bankruptcy context is the relegation of 
                                                                                                     
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1979). 
 79. See, e.g., Lynch v. GMAC, 170 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (stating “[t]his Court can see 
no reason why the circuit courts and the district court[s], in exercising their equitable powers, can 
condition the right of rescission, but the bankruptcy court cannot”). 
 80. See Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 461. 
288 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
a creditor’s secured interest to an unsecured interest.81  Whether a security interest 
is demoted to an unsecured status hinges largely upon the timing of rescission, 
which in turn is determined by whether the rescission was automatic or 
conditional.82  Divergent views arise within the bankruptcy courts as to whether the 
notice of rescission, when exercised by the debtor, automatically voids the security 
interest.83  
The majority of courts, “including the First Circuit, have concluded that 
rescission does not flow automatically from the borrower’s mailing of a notice of 
rescission.”84  Although this reasoning may appear to depart from the statutory 
language of TILA, courts have interpreted section 1635(b) to require that “the 
security interest becomes void when the [borrower] exercises a right to rescind that 
is available in the particular case, either because the creditor acknowledges that the 
right of rescission is available, or because the appropriate decision maker has so 
determined.”85  Courts have justified this interpretation based on notions of equity, 
largely in favor of creditors, and the belief that to allow borrowers to simply allege 
rescission is an “untenable proposition.”86  
In contrast, bankruptcy courts holding that rescission flows automatically from 
the notice of rescission from the borrower rely simply on the literal reading of 
section 1635(b).87  In a bankruptcy setting, this view argues that “there is a 
legitimate, legal impediment to the debtor’s reciprocal performance.  It would be 
palpably unfair to deny the relief to which a consumer is entitled under TIL[A] 
because that consumer has also availed himself of bankruptcy relief.”88  This 
consumer-friendly approach addresses some of the problems and inequities that 
existed prior to TILA under traditional rules of contract law.89  
                                                                                                     
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 458-59. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 459 (holding “[n]either [TILA] or [Regulation Z] establishes ‘that a borrowers 
mere assertion of the right of rescission has the automatic effect of voiding the contract’”) (quoting 
Large, 292 F.3d at 54)); Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(“[R]eject[ing] the argument that a demand for rescission under TILA is somehow self-executing and 
results in the automatic voiding of the loan agreement”); and Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 
F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the mere “communicat[ion] by a notice of rescission 
[constitutes rescission] makes no sense, when . . . the lender contests the ground upon which the 
borrower rescinds”); but see In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645 (holding “[u]pon the valid exercise of 
the right of rescission, the security interest becomes void”). 
 84. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 458-59. 
 85. Large, 292 F.3d at 54-55. 
 86. Id. at 55. 
 87. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645. 
 88. Id. at 645-46. 
 89. See T. Nelson Mann, Truth-In-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974 
DUKE L.J. 1227, 1231 (1974).  The author provides a valuable hypothetical that illustrates pre-TILA 
problems that may arise in the bankruptcy or insolvency setting: 
Assume, for example, that a consumer purchased storm windows costing $2,000 and that 
he paid for them by check. Shortly thereafter, he discovered that the contract was 
voidable, rescinded the agreement by returning the windows to the seller, and demanded 
restoration of his payment. If the seller accepted the storm windows but refused to return 
the money paid, the consumer could bring an action at law to recover his property, but he 
would be at a serious disadvantage. He not only would have lost the use of the storm 
windows and his money, but he would also bear the risk that by the time he obtains an 
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Because of the inequities and possible abuses that could arise in situations of 
automatic rescission, the majority of circuits still rely on their equitable power to 
exercise conditional rescission in the bankruptcy setting.  Ironically, TILA, enacted 
to protect and better inform consumers in credit transactions, rarely exercises its 
rescission powers to an extent that allows consumers to enjoy a windfall in the 
bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy setting although the statute clearly provides that this 
windfall does indeed exist. 
C.  The Home: Secured or Unsecured? 
The determination of whether rescission is automatic or conditional has 
significant consequences in evaluating the status of the security interest.  If the 
borrower’s notice of rescission is found to automatically void the creditor’s 
security interest, that security interest may be relegated to an unsecured status in 
the bankruptcy setting.90  One consequence of the security interest becoming 
unsecured is that the borrower may be able to have that unsecured debt discharged 
in bankruptcy.91  In essence, the unsecured loan may be treated like other consumer 
debt, such as credit card debt.  The principal dwelling of a borrower is one of the 
most common security interests that exists in the consumer-lending arena and is the 
most relevant interest when examining rescission under section 1635(b) of TILA.  
Furthermore, a debtor whose principal residence is secured by a second mortgage 
or a refinancing agreement, wholly unsupported by equity, may have that loan 
“stripped off” and avoided through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.92  In order to 
understand the importance of the nature of the debtor’s security interest, it is 
meaningful to understand the role of equity as it relates to that security interest. 
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is that the bankruptcy court is a 
court of equity.93  Because the term “equity” has various meanings within 
bankruptcy jurisprudence,94 it is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore the 
intricacies of each definition.  There are several key sections within the bankruptcy 
code that apply principles of equity to situations involving creditor misconduct.  
Under section 510 of Title 11 of the United States Code,95 a creditor’s claims may 
                                                                                                     
enforceable judgment the seller may no longer be solvent. Furthermore, the burden of 
bringing suit would fall entirely on the consumer, who must assume litigation expenses if 
he is to recover any of the consideration that he has paid. 
Id. 
 90. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 646. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2009). 
 93. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 
(1945); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535 
(1900). 
 94. The term “equity” has various meanings depending on the context in which it is used.  Equity 
has historically been linked to issues of “jurisdiction, procedures, court powers, justice, an ownership 
interest, or type of right.”  Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law Of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking In A Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (2006).   
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2009).  Section 510 states in relevant part: 
(a) A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent 
that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
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be equitably subordinated to other creditors’ claims because of misconduct on the 
part of the offending creditor.  Equitable subordination allows a bankruptcy court 
to procedurally reorganize the priority of the offending creditor’s claim in respect 
to other creditors.96  Thus, the nature of the debtor’s security interest becomes vital 
to the reorganization of the estate and in determining which creditors will get paid 
first.  If a creditor’s security interest goes from secured to unsecured status, the 
creditor’s collateral is at risk of discharge if the debtor files for bankruptcy.   The 
creditor’s collateral is especially at-risk if there are multiple creditors and limited 
assets.   
Consequently, for creditors to maximize the recovery of assets in bankruptcy, 
they must maintain their priority as a secured creditor or face the risk of limited 
recovery.  Absent a TILA violation, creditors enjoy considerable protection of their 
security interest in the debtor’s home under the bankruptcy code.97  If a creditor’s 
interest is demoted to an unsecured status, the risk of discharge is increased even 
further and the creditor may see no recovery.  The relegation of a creditor’s 
formerly secured interest to one that is unsecured is a frightening scenario for 
creditors in the bankruptcy setting.  This unsecured debt leaves open the possibility 
of a creditor leaving the bankruptcy table empty-handed.  The threat of an 
unsecured interest in bankruptcy is a powerful motivator for creditors to fight 
tooth-and-nail to maintain their security interest in a debtor’s home. 
D.  In re Jaaskelainen: An Illustration of the Future? 
A recent case from the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of 
Massachusetts Eastern Division, illustrates some of the competing rationales 
lurking within the First Circuit.  In In re Jaaskelainen,98 the debtor-borrowers were 
                                                                                                     
(b) For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a 
purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages 
arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution 
allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims 
or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security, 
except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common 
stock. 
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the 
court may— 
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim 
or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or 
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the 
estate. 
Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2009).  Section 1322(b) states in relevant part: 
The plan may . . . modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim 
secured by only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal 
residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of 
any class of claims.  
Id. 
 98. 391 B.R. 627 (2008). 
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facing an imminent foreclosure of their home in Massachusetts.99  In order to avoid 
foreclosure, the debtors entered into a refinancing agreement with a creditor.100  
The refinancing mortgage and note was secured by the debtor’s home.101  Less than 
a year after the refinancing, the debtors defaulted on their loan payments and 
consulted an attorney to “get a financial overview of their predicament.”102  Upon 
inspection of the closing documents, the attorney discovered that the debtor’s had 
not received the correct number of Notices of Right to Cancel (the NOR) as 
mandated by TILA and Regulation Z.103  On behalf of the debtors, the attorney sent 
the creditors written notification of a request for rescission of the refinancing.104  
Approximately one week after requesting rescission, the debtors filed for Chapter 
13 bankruptcy and listed the refinancing debt as unsecured non-priority debt on 
their Schedule F.105  The creditors subsequently “filed a proof of claim asserting a 
claim . . . secured by real property.”106  The debtors then filed an objection to the 
creditor’s claim and soon thereafter the creditors commenced an adversary 
proceeding.107  
The creditors argued that the mere assertion of rescission is not tantamount to 
an automatic rescission, but rather rescission should be conditioned upon tender of 
the principal.108 The creditors “assert[ed] that rescission of the loan without 
requiring tender would be entirely inequitable and constitute a severe penalty to 
[creditors] and an undeserved windfall for the [d]ebtors.”109   
The debtors argued that they did not receive the required number of NOR’s 
pursuant to TILA, which “gave rise to an extended rescission period, during which 
they validly exercised their right.”110  Furthermore, the debtors argued “that they 
ha[d] no obligation to tender funds back to the [creditors] in light of their 
bankruptcy filing . . . and it [was] well established in [their] district that tender is 
not a condition of rescission in Chapter 13.”111  Relying upon In re Myers112 and In 
re Whitley,113 the debtors argued that, in Massachusetts, conditional rescission is 
inappropriate in the bankruptcy setting.114  Addressing the issue of equity, Judge 
Hillman stated in Myers that “[t]he equities . . . lie in the debtor’s favor.  Upholding 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 631. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 633-34.  
 103. Id. at 635. 
 104. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 635.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 639. 
 109. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 636. 
 110. Id. at 636. 
 111. Id. at 637.  See Myers v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg., Co. (In re Myers), 175 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1994) (holding that “rescission by a[] [debtor] is not conditioned by tender or payment in the 
context of a bankruptcy case”)) and Whitley v. Rhodes Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Whitley), 177 B.R. 142, 
153 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the debtor was not required to tender in order for rescission to 
be valid). 
 112. 175 B.R. 122 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). 
 113. 177 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). 
 114. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 637. 
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the creditor’s plea . . . would allow the creditor to escape the consequences of a 
serious TIL[A] violation, while at the same time negating the fresh start given the 
debtors upon discharge.”115  Judge Hillman went on to state that “[j]udicial 
preconditioning of cancellation of the creditor’s lien on the [debtor’s] tender is 
inappropriate in bankruptcy cases.”116  The court in In re Whitley also held that 
there should not be a bright-line rule that conditions rescission upon the tender by 
the borrower.  Applying principles of equity, Judge Feeney stated: 
[C]ourts in their effort to insure a just result should not forget that the TILA was 
passed primarily to aid the unsophisticated consumer and that it was intended to 
balance scales thought to be weighted in favor of lenders and . . . to be liberally 
construed in favor of borrowers.117 
In In re Jaaskelainen, Judge Hillman, applying his earlier reasoning from In re 
Myers, found the position of the debtor more persuasive than that of the creditor.  
Judge Hillman stated that “rescission by an obligor is not conditioned by tender or 
payment in the context of a bankruptcy case.”118  Additionally, the court expounded 
on its rationale for treating rescission in the bankruptcy context different than 
outside of bankruptcy by stating: 
Essentially, when a borrower rescinds a transaction and the security interest is 
terminated as a matter of law, the creditor is left with an unsecured debt.  Outside a 
bankruptcy proceeding, this characterization is of little consequence because 
unsecured debts must otherwise be paid in full, failing which, a creditor may take 
steps to reacquire a security interest.  In a bankruptcy proceeding, however, 
unsecured debts are paid pro rata and may be discharged without payment. 
Requiring a Chapter 13 Debtor to tender the full amount of the loan on a creditor’s 
now unsecured claim would unfairly discriminate among unsecured claims in 
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).119 
Based on notions of equity, section 1635(b) of TILA has in the majority of 
cases applied a court’s power to condition rescission in favor of creditors.  In the 
bankruptcy context, rescission becomes more complex because the courts must 
balance the technical considerations of bankruptcy against the Truth-in-Lending 
guidelines.  Rescission is a tool that is capable of producing inequitable results in 
an area of law, namely bankruptcy, which is charged with upholding traditional 
notions of equity.  It is inevitable that harsh or inequitable outcomes will result 
from adversarial proceedings involving a debtor and creditor.  “Although the policy 
of avoiding harsh Truth-in-Lending sanctions has great weight in cases where both 
damages and rescission of the debt are imposed by the Act, we find it inapplicable 
when the harshness results from events, [i.e., bankruptcy] independent of the Truth-
                                                                                                     
 115. In re Myers, 175 B.R. at 129 (quoting In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004, 1007-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1982)). 
 116. In re Myers, 175 B.R. at 128 (quoting Celona v. Equitable Nat’l Bank, 98 B.R. 705, 707 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989)). 
 117. In re Whitley, 177 B.R. at 152-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 118. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645.  
 119. Id. at 646. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2009) states that “[i]f the plan classifies claims, [the plan 
shall] provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class.”  Id. (relating to a debtor’s 
bankruptcy plan). 
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in-Lending claim.”120  In In re Jaaskelainen, the court found the creditors inequity 
arguments unpersuasive and found that “[r]equiring a Chapter 13 Debtor to tender 
the full amount of the loan on a creditor’s now unsecured claim would unfairly 
discriminate among unsecured claims in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).”121  
The apparent victory for the minority view in In re Jaaskelainen was short-
lived.  On appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
vacated the “determination that rescission may not be conditioned upon tender by 
Debtors.”122  Relying on the majority view among the circuit courts, Judge Zobel 
concluded that “rescission does not flow automatically from the [debtor’s] mailing 
of a notice of rescission.”123  In addition to the traditional equity arguments that 
rely upon section 1635(b) for courts to procedurally modify the rescission 
sequence, Judge Zobel focused with equal force on congressional intent.  Arguing 
that one of the objectives in the enactment of section 1635(b) was to restore the 
status quo ante; Judge Zobel reasoned that this objective could not be met if 
rescission was found to be automatic upon the mere assertion of the debtor.124  The 
District Court’s reasoning and holding on appeal is consistent with the modern 
approach to rescission in bankruptcy.  With the historical precedent of equity on 
their side, it would be a monumental task for the minority position to jettison the 
equity argument in favor of a literal reading of the sequence of events set forth in 
the statute.  In this regard, In re Jaaskelainen is likely an illustration of the future—
courts will almost unilaterally condition rescission on tender by the debtor.   
Following the District Court’s ruling in In re Jaaskelainen, the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Western Division, issued a 
holding similar in effect to that provided by the Bankruptcy Court in In re 
Jaaskelainen.  Judge Boroff, in In re Giza,125 “respectfully [took] a different 
view”126 from Judge Zobel’s opinion and reasoned that the procedures that may be 
modified “occur[] after the security interest has been voided.”127  The debtors in In 
re Giza refinanced their property in Palmer, Massachusetts and later discovered 
that their refinancing documents were missing the requisite number of NOR’s and 
Truth-in-Lending disclosures.128  The debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
approximately one year later and listed their refinance lender’s debt as unsecured 
on their bankruptcy schedules.129  Per the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, their lender 
                                                                                                     
 120. In re Piercy, 18 B.R. at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 627. 
 122. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 463. 
 123. Id. at 458-59. 
 124. Id. at 460.  Judge Zobel relied heavily on Ray v. Citifinancial, Inc. for his explanation of 
Congress’s intent which, in relevant part, stated: 
Within the meaning of the law, “rescission” does not mean an annulment that is 
definitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement. Rather, it contemplates a remedy 
that restores the status quo ante. If a party has a legal or equitable right to annul a 
transaction, he may do so, but only upon returning any benefit he has received. 
Ray v. Citifinancial, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 664, 667 (D. Md. 2002). 
 125. Giza v. Amcap Mortg. Inc. (In re Giza), 428 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010). 
 126. Id. at 273. 
 127. Id. at 275. 
 128. Id. at 268-69. 
 129. Id. at 269. 
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would receive a pro rata share of the dividends that would be paid out to the 
unsecured creditors.130  The lender objected to the plan, relying largely in part on 
the decision of Judge Zobel in In re Jaaskelainen.131   
Judge Boroff’s approach makes a crucial distinction between the process of 
rescission and the voiding of the security interest—they are separate according to 
Massachusetts General Laws. The provision in the Massachusetts’s version of 
TILA, supplemented through the Massachusetts Code of Regulations, is structured 
in a manner that allows for the rescission procedures to be modified, but explicitly 
does not address the process of modifying the underlying security interest.132  
Judge Boroff, like Judge Hillman in In re Jaaskelainen, reasoned that requiring the 
debtor to tender the proceeds to their lender “would violate the requirements of § 
1322(a)(3) by giving [the lender] unsecured preferential treatment.”133  Because of 
the amount of the lender’s claim, the debtor’s unsecured creditors would receive 
little, possibly nothing, in dividends.134  Furthermore, Judge Boroff reasoned that 
even if tender is required for rescission, the court needs to examine the debtor’s 
ability to pay the principal amount.135  The court ultimately decided that, if the 
conditions for rescission were met, it would “determine the amount of tender and 
order the [debtors] to classify that claim and treat it consistently with those of other 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id.   
 131. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 273. 
 132. The Massachusetts law  states, in relevant part: 
(4) Effects of Rescission 
(a) When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of 
rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including 
any finance charge. 
(b) Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return 
any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction 
and shall take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest. 
(c) If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain 
possession until the creditor has met its obligation under 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b). When the 
creditor has complied with 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b), the consumer shall tender the money 
or property to the creditor or, where the latter would be impracticable or inequitable, 
tender its reasonable value. At the consumer’s option, tender of property may be made at 
the location of the property or at the consumer’s residence. Tender of money must be 
made at the creditor’s designated place of business. If the creditor does not take 
possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days after the consumer’s tender, 
the consumer may keep it without further obligation. 
(d) The procedures outlined in 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b) and (c) may be modified by court 
order. 
209 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.23 (2010).  Accordingly, under Judge Boroff’s reasoning, the procedures that 
may be modified occur after the security interest has already been extinguished and the procedures that 
may be modified occur in an environment where there is no longer a remaining security interest. 
 133. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 275.  Section 1322(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “if the plan 
classifies claims, [the plan shall] provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class . . . 
.”  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2009). 
 134. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 275. 
 135. Id. at 275 (quoting Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 462 (urging the bankruptcy court on remand to 
consider “the appropriate conditions to impose on Debtor’s exercise of rescission.  In understanding this 
evaluation the bankruptcy court should consider traditional equitable notions, including such factors as 
the severity of Appellants’ MCCCDA violation and the degree to which Debtors are able to pay the 
principal amount”)). 
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unsecured creditors.”136  Although the holding of the Giza court disagreed with that 
of the District Court, the reasoning and outcome harmonized the Massachusetts 
version of the TILA laws with the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Rescission may 
be allowed, but it does not follow that the debtor will walk away from the 
obligation—the court may establish the appropriate tender amount leaving the onus 
on the debtor to then determine the classification of the now unsecured claim. 
E.  The Maine Approach 
Although there is very little case law in Maine regarding conditional rescission 
of a loan in the bankruptcy setting, the limited law that does exist does not bode 
well for debtors.  One of the few cases in the First Circuit, and the only one from 
Maine, that has addressed this issue has found that rescission can be conditioned 
upon tender by the borrower.  In New Maine National Bank v. Gendron,137 the 
District Court held that when “[debtors] have the right to rescind the loan 
transaction with [a creditor], such rescission is subject, in the exercise of the 
Court’s discretion, to being conditioned upon the return of the loan proceeds.”138  
Adopting the majority approach of courts, Judge Carter stated that “equity demands 
such condition[al] rescission.”139  In Gendron, the debtors were seeking rescission 
of a loan acquired to satisfy tax liabilities and later discovered a disclosure 
violation in their loan documents.140  Shortly thereafter, the debtors filed a Chapter 
7 petition for bankruptcy.141  Although the court recognized the debtors’ right to 
rescission, principle of equity governed the court’s statutory grant of rescission.   
Nearly one hundred and seventy years prior to Gendron, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, set forth the proposition that has been 
embraced by the modern majority of circuits.  In Norton v. Young,142 the Law Court 
held that, in exchanging goods, where “one person defrauds the other, who elects to 
rescind the contract, it is not enough for the injured person to give notice to the 
other and call on him to receive his goods, but he must return them to the person 
defrauding him before any right of action accrues.”143  Because Young dealt with 
fraud being exercised upon the debtor seeking to rescind, the conditional rescission 
declaration may be more forceful.  In many instances of asserted rescission, the 
debtor is relying upon a minor or technical omission within the closing documents.  
The importance of restoring the status quo ante in situations where the debtor is a 
victim of fraud is indicative of the courts reluctance to impute an inequity on even 
the wrongdoers.  Additionally, this case was not argued in the bankruptcy context, 
but it is apparent that traditional notions of contract law have continued to 
influence rescission disputes. 
The Maine equivalent of TILA, codified as part of the Maine Consumer Credit 
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Code (MCCC Truth-in-Lending),144 allows for the sequence of procedures to be 
modified by the court in the same manner provided by TILA.  The only significant 
departure of the MCCC Truth-in-Lending from TILA is the inclusion of the 
language “[i]f the creditor has delivered any property to the [debtor], the [debtor] 
may retain possession of it.”145  Apart from the varied language between the 
MCCC Truth-in-Lending and TILA, Judge Carter relied on the almost identical 
amended language of both statutes, particularly the omnipresent phrase: “The 
procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered 
by a court.”146   Maine echoes the approach taken by most courts by providing that 
rescission can be conditioned upon tender by the borrower. 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
As Judge Zobel stated in Wells Fargo, “[a]lthough the First Circuit has not 
spoken, the majority of circuit courts to consider the issue agree that courts have 
the equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower.”147  Even in 
the absence of a direct ruling by the First Circuit, it appears likely that the majority 
view will be adopted.  One of the principal motives behind TILA was to provide 
consumers with an accurate portrayal of the financial transaction they were 
entering.  Creditors could still charge exorbitant interest rates over questionable 
durations—they simply had to disclose that fact according to the provisions set 
forth in TILA.  The dominant position has been to allow consumers to rescind the 
transaction upon a later discovered omission, conditioned on their return of the 
principal loan amount.  The subordinate position has been to apply a literal reading 
of the statute and allow the consumer to rescind the transaction and have their 
security interest terminated, with the final step of the process being the tender back 
of the principal loan amount.  Arguably, each position visits some inequity on the 
party whose view is not advanced by the court.  This Comment asserts that there 
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are alternative positions supported by case law that may depart from the majority 
and minority views but still fall under the umbrella of equity. 
At first glance, it appears that the court’s power to condition rescission is 
limited to one of two scenarios: first, that rescission is automatic and the creditor 
terminates the security interest and will then be tendered back their loan principal; 
and second, the consumer must tender back the principal, at which point the 
security interest is terminated and the loan is rescinded.  Under the language of 
section 1635(b), however, “[t]he procedures prescribed by this subsection shall 
apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.”148  Although this provision has 
been applied almost exclusively to the aforementioned scenarios, the courts have 
the statutory authority to condition rescission on factors that may exercise more 
equity in favor of the debtors than the majority approach.  This flexible approach 
may be labeled the “balancing rescission model.”  
The balancing rescission model may be seen as a fusion of the existing 
approaches found across the spectrum of courts.  The model may be applied by 
weighing the depth or seriousness of the TILA violation against the debtor’s 
proposed rescission and underlying financial position.  The scale for this test has 
three positions: the first position is weighted in favor of the debtor; the second is a 
point of equilibrium, where the parties are returned to the positions they were in 
before the transaction; and the third position is weighted in favor of the creditor.  
For the test to weigh in favor of the debtor, the court would need to find 
particularly egregious or predatory behavior on the part of the lender.  In this 
scenario, the court should be less inclined to condition rescission upon tender by 
the borrower if they are a victim of fraud or unscrupulous behavior.  Additionally, 
this approach requires the court to tailor its reasoning to the facts specific to the 
case at hand, but also liberates the courts from being tethered to a bright-line rule 
that introduces uncertainty and inequity in certain loan transactions.  Cases that fall 
under this line of reasoning are compelling and re-enforce the public policy 
rationale that is invariably embedded in the TILA. 
For example, in Cole v. Lovett,149 the debtors were solicited by vinyl siding 
salesmen at their home and eventually agreed to have the siding installed.  Prior to 
installation, the debtors requested that the company delay the installation because 
they were not sure if they still wanted the siding.150  Despite the debtor’s request to 
delay installation, the workers began work immediately and prior to the statutory 
three-day expiration for the right to rescind.151  Additionally, the sellers failed to 
notify the debtors that they were securing the siding by taking a security interest in 
their home, and failed to properly provide the debtors with all the necessary 
disclosure documents.152  The court stated: 
[The sellers] attempted to deprive plaintiffs of their right to rescind, first, by 
failing to inform them of the right and, secondly, by subtly forcing them to accept 
the siding . . . although rescission is an equitable remedy and conditions may be 
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placed on the exercise of that right, the equity in this case does not lie with the 
defendants.153   
Although this holding seems to parallel that of the minority position, the 
deceitful conduct of the sellers factored heavily into the court’s reasoning.  The 
sellers’ behavior was precisely the type of conduct that TILA sought to deter and, 
accordingly, the seller was forced to bear the brunt of the losses.  Lovett illustrates 
one end of the spectrum of the “balancing rescission model” proposed in this 
Comment.  This end of the spectrum exacts a certain amount of inequity upon the 
creditors, but is justified in doing so because of the nature of the lender’s actions.  
This outcome should be applied in only the most egregious of circumstances or 
where a creditor persistently makes TILA violations.154 
In order for equilibrium to be achieved under the “balancing rescission 
model,” the parties must be returned to the positions they were in prior to the 
transaction.  This is accomplished by implementing section 1635(b) as it was 
intended under the purest of circumstances.  In this scenario, a debtor may choose 
to rescind the transaction because of a minor technical violation or inadvertent 
omission.  The creditor releases the security interest and returns all fees to the 
debtor, who then returns the principal amount of the loan.  However, within this 
zone of equilibrium, there may be room for an additional approach.  This approach 
would allow the creditor and debtor to modify the terms of repayment in the 
rescission process.  It may be viewed as a settlement-like process, allowing for the 
debtor and creditor to achieve a resolution that satisfies both parties. 
To illustrate, in In re Sterten,155 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the “concept of permitting a consumer a 
reasonable time frame to repay the creditor while the creditor retains the security 
interest it acquired in the rescinded transaction to be a balanced, equitable 
approach.”156  The In re Sterten court found that the creditor had made material 
violations in the loan transaction with the debtor, but allowed the parties to 
structure a repayment plan over an extended duration, at a reasonable interest 
rate.157  Judge Frank found the material violation “was not a transaction that 
involved any pervasive overreaching or irregularities . . . [and the] nature of the 
statutory violation in this case would support a repayment period and an interest 
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rate more favorable to Option One.”158  The balancing approach employed by the 
court allowed the transaction to be rescinded by stretching the boundaries of equity 
to its outermost limits.  By allowing the creditor to receive payment over an 
extended period of time, and reducing the payments to a level that was affordable 
by the debtor, the court found the intensive fact-finding mission to be an equitable 
mechanism for complying with TILA.159  Although this “repayment” approach 
arguably strikes a balance between the debtor and the creditor, the scale has the 
potential to tip slightly in favor of one side.  The creditor may be getting a less 
favorable interest rate than they originally contracted for, over a longer period of 
time—tipping in favor of the debtor.  Conversely, a debtor may be obligated to 
future payments that are affordable, but slightly suffocating under the weight of 
other bankruptcy creditors.  Thus, the repayment method has the advantage of 
allowing the parties to leave the bankruptcy table with a little something in hand, 
but arguably less than they would have hoped.  This approach may require more 
legwork on the part of the court, but it offers an equitable solution where none is 
otherwise provided. 
For the “balanced rescission” test to weigh in favor of creditors, a court would 
need to find an unwarranted windfall in favor of the debtor.  In this scenario, the 
court should be more inclined to condition rescission on tender by the borrower 
where the debtor would reap an unreasonable windfall because of a minor technical 
violation.  This situation may arise when a debtor attempts to rescind a loan, but the 
debtor has already consumed the principal loan amount or has no ability to tender 
their loan proceeds. 
For example, in In re Requilman, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of California found that a court may condition the rescission of a 
loan on tender by the borrower when “the TILA violation giving rise to the right to 
rescind is not egregious, and where the lender would otherwise be left with an 
unsecured claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy.”160  In In re Requilman, the 
borrowers executed two refinancing loans, each secured by their principal 
residence.161  Less than three years later, the borrowers filed a petition for Chapter 
7 bankruptcy, at which point the Chapter 7 trustee handled the estate.162  The 
trustee found a minor TILA violation within one of the loans and sought rescission 
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under TILA.163  Because the trustee was unable to tender back the principal on the 
loan, Judge Carlson held that the court “can deny rescission at any time it 
determines that the borrower cannot make the required tender.”164 In In re 
Requilman, the court was faced with the possible inequities that would be visited 
upon the creditor in the absence of conditional rescission.  Judge Carlson explained 
that the conditioning of rescission upon tender by the trustee was appropriate by 
stating: 
[T]here is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after 
deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission 
is warranted when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission 
still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the 
borrower’s rescission obligations no matter what. Such a decision lies within the 
court’s equitable discretion, taking into consideration all the circumstances 
including the nature of the violations and the borrower’s ability to repay the 
proceeds. In the present case, Trustee is unable to make the required tender 
immediately. Trustee should not be afforded additional time to make the tender, 
because the Bank will be entitled to take all the proceeds from a sale of the 
Residence, whether or not the [] Loan is rescinded. In this situation, it would be 
inequitable to continue to restrain the Bank from exercising its right to foreclose 
upon the Residence, when such restraint would provide no meaningful benefit to 
the bankruptcy estate or Debtor.165 
Cases like In re Requilman align with a court’s equitable power to condition 
rescission on tender by the borrower.166  The approach that weighs in favor of the 
creditors is closely related to the majority view because courts are cautious when 
large consumer loans have the potential to be discharged in bankruptcy.   
Thus, although the First Circuit has not expressly declared that it has the 
equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower, the 
overwhelming case law and section 1635(b) of TILA imply that it does indeed 
possess that power.  The more important question is how should that power be 
exercised?  A bright-line application that holds all assertions of rescission are 
conditioned upon a borrower tender is arguably too restrictive and weighted too 
heavily in favor of creditors.  Conversely, a strict adherence to the literal language 
of section 1635(b) exposes creditors to potentially devastating losses in the 
bankruptcy setting based upon minor technical violations.   
Additionally, due to the current state of the housing market, many debtors in 
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bankruptcy are able to “strip off” second mortgages and residence-related loans via 
the lien avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Consequently, the eligible 
debtor in Chapter 13 may find the “strip off” provisions of the Code more useful 
and more affordable than the process of rescission.  Also, many refinanced or 
consolidated loans will not be eligible for rescission pursuant to the language of 
Regulation Z.167  As long as the debtor’s home has no equity to support the 
underlying obligations, they can treat that obligation as a general unsecured claim 
subject to similar treatment as their credit card debt.  Currently, this is achieved 
quite easily because of the declining value of homes coupled with many debtors’ 
burdensome second mortgage loans.  The “strip off” provisions are not helpful for 
those debtors looking to rescind their primary mortgage because these mortgages 
will always be supported by equity and would be disqualified from lien avoidance.  
Although the “balancing rescission model” is more labor and fact intensive, it 
allows a court to merge the concepts of equity with a statutory scheme.  By 
examining the behavior and financial climate of the parties involved, courts are 
better able to avoid inequities.  This avoidance stems from a court’s freedom to not 
be bound by inconsistent case law or statutes that are silent on the issue. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As this Comment has illustrated, how rescission is treated in bankruptcy is 
uncertain and unsettled.  The competing rationales among the circuits have created 
a philosophical divide on the issue: the majority, arguing that rescission under 
TILA intends to return creditors and debtors to their positions prior to the 
transaction and, the minority, arguing that rescission is a punitive remedy for TILA 
violations. The role of equity within a statutory framework has allowed the 
bankruptcy courts to speak where the Code is silent, but the voices are saying 
different things.  In order to harmonize these competing rationales, the First Circuit 
will need to strike a balance between the Bankruptcy Code, the language of TILA 
or applicable state equivalents, and the principles of equity.  The careful weighing 
of the competing interests may actualize this balance by focusing on the facts and 
behavior of the parties involved.  This balancing act may demand judges and courts 
to expend more time and energy on the details and nuances within their cases, but 
that is the unintended consequence when the law is painted in shades of gray.  
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